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I. Executive Summary
Both laypersons and scientists alike are uncomfortable with animal research when it
causes animals to suffer. The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) has launched
our Pain & Distress Initiative to work with the scientific community to eliminate
significant laboratory animal suffering by the year 2020. This goal is consistent with
public opinion on animal research and with laws, regulations, and guidelines governing
the conduct of animal research. While eliminating significant animal suffering in the
laboratory is an ambitious target, what is needed along the way is a focused, urgent effort
to recognize, alleviate, and prevent such suffering, so that science can progress without
causing pain and distress to animals.
Polls have begun to document the influence of animal suffering on people's views toward
animal research. For example, a recent poll (Aldous, Coghlan, and Copley, 1999) found
that the British public's support for research on mice or monkeys declines 16% to 35%
(depending on the species and field of research) when the animals are subjected to pain,
illness, or surgery (factors associated with suffering). Similarly, American psychologists'
and psychology students' support of animal research declines 43% to 50% (depending on
the species) when asked to compare research involving caging or confinement and
research involving pain and death (Plous 1996a, 1996b). The contrast between the
media's (and public's) responses to two high profile cases of research in the 1980s (Baby
Fae and the University of Pennsylvania Head Trauma lab) also illustrates the importance
of the perceived level of animal suffering.

Public concern for research animal suffering has led to passage of two laws regulating
animal research. Both laws, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and the Health Research
Extension Act (HREA), seek to reduce any likely pain and distress experienced by
research animals. Both seek to do so primarily through the establishment of Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs), which review in-house research proposals
and periodically assess their facility's animal care and use program. Under the AWA,
IACUCs are also required to ensure that researchers have searched for alternatives if their
proposed animal research is likely to cause pain and distress, even if anesthetics and
analgesics are used to prevent suffering. Despite its regulatory emphasis on alleviating
pain and distress, the USDA provides little explicit guidance on the topic or on the
potential impact of specific experimental procedures, such as infecting animals with
pathogenic organisms, on animal well being.
The USDA issues annual reports that summarize data on the number of animals of
regulated species used in research, testing, and education. This information is grouped
under column headings that correspond to the USDA's pain and distress categories:
•
•
•

procedures involving little or no pain or distress (Column C)
pain or distress alleviated with drugs (Column D)
pain or distress not alleviated because pain-relieving drugs would have interfered
with the research (Column E)

Nationwide, about 55% of the over one million regulated animals used in research are
typically reported in Column C, 35% in Column D, and 10% in Column E. In their
annual reports to the USDA, research institutions are asked to describe any Column E
procedures (unalleviated pain and distress) and explain why pain relieving-drugs were
withheld.
The USDA's pain classification system has been criticized on several grounds. The
current categories are confusing and there is no category for procedures causing pain and
distress that were partially but not fully alleviated with drugs. The categories do not
adequately address the issue of levels of pain and distress (the current categories boil
down to a yes/no dichotomy). There is no definition for "distress" although the USDA is
now working to produce one. There is no specific guidance to institutions on how to
complete the annual report forms, nor is there effective USDA oversight of institutional
decisions on categorization of actual experiments. It is not surprising, then, that an HSUS
analysis of the annual statistics on animal use for recent reporting years reveals enormous
(and unexplained) variation from state to state in the reporting of animals used in painful
procedures without the administration of pain-relieving drugs.
Several foreign countries have pain classification systems that are more straightforward
and meaningful than the U.S. system. Many of these systems report levels of pain and
distress as minor, moderate, or severe, or some variation thereof. Recent statistics from
The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada indicate that approximately 30% to 45% of
research animals experience significant pain and distress, whereas the comparable US

numbers (Column E) average only about 10%. Similarly, the Canadians report that 13%
of the animals used in the category of basic research experience moderate to severe pain.
By contrast, the top fifty National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded non-profit research
institutions in the US reported less than 1% of animals experiencing pain and distress in
1996 and 1997. These discrepancies appear to be largely the result of the shortcomings of
the US reporting system, rather than on differences in the alleviation of pain and distress
or the lack of figures on non-regulated species in the US (lab-bred mice and rats, as well
as birds, reptiles, amphibians, and fish).
Pain and distress caused by specific research models and techniques raise serious
concerns for those in the animal welfare community as well as in the scientific
community. Yet good estimates of how much animal pain and/or animal distress is
caused by particular techniques or methods are not yet available. The HSUS has
compiled a preliminary list of research models and techniques that cause pain and
distress. Analyses by the USDA and HSUS indicate that the majority of the animals
reported in Column E are used in various testing procedures, with vaccine testing
prominent among them. More data are needed to discriminate amongst research models
and specific techniques in terms of the pain and distress they typically induce. Pain and
distress may be specific to a particular research model, species, or gender and may affect
the extent of suffering caused in that particular animal model. Such information is critical
to informed decision-making by researchers, IACUCs, and others.
Despite the regulatory emphasis on alleviating pain and distress, The HSUS recognizes
that the systematic reduction of animal pain and distress in the research laboratory is not
a trivial task, for several reasons. First, there is much conceptual confusion in the use of
terms such as pain, distress and suffering, and how they relate to one another. Most of the
relevant literature concentrates on pain, not distress or suffering. Second, animal use in
the laboratory is quite varied; refinements developed for any one specific procedure do
not necessarily translate to other procedures. Third, animal pain, distress and suffering
are not easy to recognize or measure unambiguously and there is considerable
opportunity for legitimate disagreement among scientists. Sensitive, practical measures to
gauge levels of distress in common laboratory animal species do not presently exist. For
the most part, animal care staff rely on ad hoc observations or on relatively insensitive
measures such as weight loss, to ascertain whether animals are experiencing pain and/or
distress. Fourth, there is limited published information about animals' experience of pain,
distress, and suffering caused by typical laboratory procedures. Fifth, lab personnel may
develop "distancing mechanisms" that help them cope with causing harm to animals but
which can also lead to people ignoring or overlooking pain or distress that, with more
attention, could be alleviated or avoided altogether.
If principal investigators, lab personnel, and IACUCs do not currently have the tools to
document distress objectively, or do not recognize distress caused by disease, toxic
agents or psychological factors, then it is unlikely that they will take action to alleviate
such distress when it occurs. It is therefore essential to promote a discussion on when
distress occurs and to achieve some consensus on those procedures that cause either pain
or distress. It is not beyond the scope and responsibility of the scientific community to

determine underlying principles of pain and distress alleviation in animals which can then
be applied to the varied models and methods.
To help encourage a more systematic approach to pain and distress management, The
HSUS has launched the Pain and Distress Initiative, which seeks to eliminate all
significant pain and distress in animal research by the year 2020. The Initiative has four
main components:
1. The HSUS has convened a group of experts on pain and distress to draft a
comprehensive report that addresses key issues, such as the levels of pain and
distress caused by common research models and techniques.
2. The HSUS is actively seeking the collaboration of IACUCs and the broader
scientific community. Through mass mailings to IACUCs, we have begun
facilitating an exchange of information and policies so that new ideas and
initiatives, including "best practices" and "humane endpoints," can be
disseminated quickly.
3. The HSUS is encouraging the USDA to adopt a new classification system that
divides pain and distress into none/minor, moderate, and severe categories. Until
the current USDA classification system is revised, The HSUS will seek to foster
more consistency and accuracy in how pain and distress are reported.
4. The HSUS plans to urge both private and government entities to fund studies
aimed at developing more sensitive and practical measures of animal distress and
methods by which such distress can be alleviated.
As part of our efforts to raise the profile of pain and distress issues with IACUCs, The
HSUS will focus on specific research areas, practices and techniques where relatively
little attention has been given to animal suffering. Our aim is to seek out new approaches
to recognizing, measuring, and alleviating animal distress. Also, The HSUS will
encourage the NIH to issue "best practice" guidelines covering specific techniques.
The HSUS urges the USDA to adopt new pain and distress categories recommended by a
committee of representatives of animal research and animal protection organizations.
Until a new system is in place, The HSUS recommends a number of improvements in the
current system, including providing IACUCs with clear definitions and examples of
levels of suffering, pain, distress, stress, and anxiety. The HSUS also recommends that:
•
•

•

funding institutions provide support for refinement research
the USDA expand regulatory coverage to birds and lab-bred mice and rats, to not
only formally provide protection to these animals under the AWA, but also to
gather statistics on pain and distress in these animals
the NIH should issue "best practice" and "humane endpoint" guidelines to
facilitate the pace of innovation in laboratory animal welfare

The public's support for animal use in biomedical research has declined in recent years.
The decrease in support is even more evident when the public is questioned about the
experimental use of animals involving pain and/or distress. Given the public's concern for
the humane treatment of animals in research and our ethical obligation to the animals

themselves, there should be greater attention provided to refining techniques, to
publicizing best practices, and to eliminating animal pain and distress. The HSUS Pain &
Distress Initiative seeks to encourage these developments, with the goal of eliminating all
significant animal pain and distress in research by the year 2020. The HSUS commends
the USDA for initiating its own analysis of pain and distress reporting, and creating a
proposed set of solutions for reducing animal pain and distress in a recent unpublished
report.
In the past few years, fortunately, there has been an increase in attention to pain and
distress issues within science and academe. These activities will lead to improvements for
both animals and the humans that rely on them. In the end, better animal welfare will lead
to better science, as pain and distress are eliminated and no longer have the opportunity to
confound scientific data.
II. Introduction
Animal research has long stimulated concern among members of the public and the
scientific community alike. While most people recognize, intellectually at least, that
biomedical scientists are searching for knowledge that will improve the lot of humans
and animals, the image of somebody deliberately and with careful forethought causing
harm to an animal in order to produce data that may lead to some future benefit has
always prompted an uncomfortable reaction outside the laboratory. As Northeastern
University ethnographer, Arnold Arluke, has demonstrated so well, this discomfort is also
shared by the scientists who use the animals (cf. Arluke, 1988 & 1989, and Arluke and
Hafferty, 1996). However, animal research is usually justified by reference to greater
benefits (new knowledge and medical treatments) over lesser costs (in animal suffering
and death). One of the costs of animal research is the suffering experienced by the
animals. This report provides some background to the issue of research animal suffering
and describes the Pain and Distress Initiative that has been launched by The Humane
Society of the United States to eliminate significant laboratory animal suffering by the
year 2020 or sooner.
The goal of eliminating pain and distress in the animal laboratory is one that few, if any,
people (especially scientists) would argue against, although some might question its
feasibility. Public opinion surveys indicate strong concern about pain and distress in
laboratory animals. Perhaps most importantly, the laws, regulations, and guidelines
governing the conduct of animal research emphasize the need to minimize pain and
distress. The HSUS initiative seeks to focus these concerns and policies into more urgent
action to eliminate pain and distress.
While eliminating significant animal suffering in the laboratory is an ambitious target, it
is certainly within the ingenuity and skills of those who use and care for laboratory
animals. What is needed is a focused effort to define what is meant by animal pain and
distress (no trivial task despite its apparent obviousness), to determine how we can best
tell when an animal is suffering significant pain and distress, to determine what areas of
research and what techniques cause such pain and distress, and then to look for

alternatives that will allow science to progress without causing such harms to animals.
While laboratory animal use has fallen by approximately fifty percent in the last twentyfive to thirty years (Reduction and Replacement of animals in research) (Rowan, Loew,
and Weer, 1995), there has been much less progress in the Refinement of animal use
(Reduction, Replacement, and Refinement are the Three Rs of Russell and Burch
(1959)).

III. Public Concerns/Attitudes
The public's perception of the levels of suffering experienced by laboratory animals used
in biomedical research and testing has fueled the controversy over animal
experimentation. This public concern has been translated into laws and regulations that
seek to limit laboratory animal suffering, pain and distress (see Section III).
When queried, members of the general public express concerns over the treatment of
non-human animals used in scientific research. In general, about 75% of the public
accepts the use of animals in research while about 65% actually support the practice.
Support for the use of animals changes according to the type of animal used and area of
research. For example, in a 1985 poll, 88% accepted the use of rats but only 55%
accepted the use of dogs. In the same poll, only 12% opposed the use of animals in
medical research on cancer or diabetes but 27% opposed the use of animals in allergy
testing (NABR, 1985). In another poll, 60% opposed the use of animals to test cosmetics
but only 20% of the same sample opposed the use of animals to test medical products
(Ward, 1990). The public is also very concerned about the treatment of research animals
and a majority support a strengthening of federal regulations and the development and
promotion of alternatives that will reduce animal suffering.
A recent poll, commissioned by the British magazine New Scientist, highlights the
influence of animal suffering on the public's views of animal experimentation. Approval
of animal research declines substantially when the experiments involve pain, illness, or
surgery (see Table 1).
Table 1. Effect of public perceptions of animal pain and
distress on public support for different types of animal
research (adapted from Aldhous et al., 1999). Animals
experience pain, illness, or surgery?

NO

YES

Mice Monkey Mice Monkey
% approval of research to develop a new
drug to cure leukemia in children

83

75

65

52

% approval for research to enable scientists
to study how the sense of hearing works

70

56

36

21

% approval for research to test whether a
garden insecticide will be harmful to people

56

43

29

16

Average % decline in support when
animals experience pain, illness, or surgery

Mice

Monkeys

26%

28%

Although the New Scientist survey was carried out in the United Kingdom, similar
attitude shifts have been reported in surveys of selected samples of the American public.
For example, Plous (1996a, 1996b) conducted two surveys of 5,000 randomly selected
members of the American Psychological Association (APA) and 2,022 psychology
students randomly sampled from 50 colleges and universities within the United States.

Both sample groups were presented with twelve different types of psychological research
which required them to indicate which types of research were justified assuming "all
research has been institutionally approved and deemed of scientific merit." As Table 2
shows, the majority of both graduate psychologists and psychology students did not
support animal research when it caused pain or death.
Table 2. Support (% of sample) for specific research procedures among American
Psychological Association members and psychology students.
APA Members Psychology Students
Observational Studies
Primates 96.0%

94.8%

Dogs

89.4%

91.0%

Rats

87.3%

91.2%

Research Involving Caging or Confinement
Primates 63.0%

57.7%

Dogs

63.4%

57.7%

Rats

77.2%

79.6%

Research Involving Pain and Death
Primates 17.7%

10.3%

Dogs

18.8%

9.4%

Rats

34.0%

29.1%

Public uneasiness about the suffering experienced by laboratory animals is also clearly
demonstrated by the different public reactions to the following two media events in the
United States.
Baby Fae
On October 26, 1984 a twelve-day-old human infant with hypoplastic left heart
syndrome, who came to be known to the world as "Baby Fae," received a baboon heart
transplant at Loma Linda University Medical Center. Three weeks later she died of
kidney failure. The operation unleashed a storm of debate and criticism. While it was
generally accepted that Baby Fae was unlikely to survive for many weeks without some
intervention (and even then her chances of long term survival were slim), questions were
raised about the extent of the hospital's search for a heart from a human infant (although
such hearts are rare) and about the lack of details on the informed consent process.
Spokespersons for Loma Linda argued that the procedure was experimental therapy that
offered Baby Fae her only chance at "long-term" survival. But the available data
indicated that her chances of surviving for more than six months with the baboon heart
were not good and several newspaper cartoons picked up on the notion that Baby Fae was
just another experimental animal.

Although most of the bioethical discussion centered on whether or not Baby Fae was
inappropriately used in a clinical experiment (as opposed to being provided with
experimental therapy), some animal activists took the opportunity of all the media
attention to criticize the use of the baboon as a donor and argued that the animal was
needlessly killed. This argument was not received with much sympathy by either the
media or the public. The Boston Herald captured the public rejection of the animal rights
argument with an editorial cartoon which featured Baby Fae on one side and a group of
animal rights activists on the other. The captions for the two sides read, "Born with half a
heart"and "Born with half a brain" respectively.
Head Trauma Laboratory
Over Memorial Day weekend in 1984, members of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
broke into a laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania Medical School. They
vandalized equipment and removed sixty hours of videotapes of head injury research on
baboons filmed by the research personnel (Fox, 1984). The laboratory used the baboons
in experiments designed to produce non-impact (e.g. whiplash) damage to the brain and
spinal chord. The animals were then studied to determine the type and extent of damage
produced and the effect of the damage on the animals' subsequent behavior. The stolen
items were delivered to People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) who
condensed the 60 hours down to a 25-minute videotape that raised questions about
surgical and animal care standards in the laboratory.
The PETA videotape was widely distributed to the media and was discussed on a variety
of popular television programs. In July 1985, the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
released an interim report that concluded that the laboratory had failed to comply with
stipulated animal care standards. Margaret Heckler, Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, did not wait for the final report. She immediately suspended
the research. During this period, both the Washington Post and the New York Times ran
editorial very critical of the research. The Washington Post went so far as to title its
editorial "Animal Torture". Criticism of the research by print and electronic media was
widespread.
These two cases - Baby Fae and the Head Trauma Laboratory - offer illustrative
contrasts. When animal activists criticized the killing of the baboon in the ultimately
futile attempt to treat Baby Fae's heart problem, the public and the media regarded the
criticism as, at best, unfounded and misplaced. By contrast, the condemnation of the head
trauma experiments by animal activists was echoed and reinforced by the media. The
critical differences between these two cases that underlie the different public and media
reactions are most probably the perceived differences in human benefit and animal costs.
In terms of costs, the suffering of the baboon used as a heart donor for Baby Fae was
perceived to be minimal or non-existent. In contrast, the baboons used in the head trauma
research were perceived to be experiencing great suffering, as evidenced by the images
on the videotape shot by the researchers themselves. In terms of potential benefits, there
was a direct exchange of the baboon's life so that Baby Fae could live (no matter that the

attempt failed) while the head trauma research promised only some vaguely identified
possible benefit sometime in the future (Rowan, Loew, and Weer, 1995).
The public's view of laboratory animal treatment and standards has changed considerably
since 1948 when a Gallup poll found that four-fifths of the public supported the use of
dogs in medical research and thought they were well cared for. There is a certain irony in
this since, in 1948, there were no laws and governmental regulations addressing
laboratory animal treatment. Today, the laws and regulations governing the use of
animals in research require significant attention (not always carried through as fully as
The HSUS considers necessary) to minimizing animal pain and distress yet the public is
much more equivocal about such animal use.
IV. Legislative Mandate
Early in the 1960s, legislation was introduced into the U.S. Congress to regulate animal
research. However, it was not until 1966 and a Life Magazine expose of the deplorable
conditions in the compound of a dog dealer that the U.S. Congress took action and passed
the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (Wayman, 1966). This original legislation regulated
only the acquisition and handling of animals by dealers. It was amended in 1970 (and the
name changed to the Animal Welfare Act, or the AWA) to include the care of warmblooded research animals in research institutions (however, birds and lab-bred rats and
mice, who account for 90% or more of all laboratory animals, were excluded from
regulatory oversight by order of the Secretary of Agriculture). The species that are
covered by the AWA regulations include non-human primates, dogs, cats, rabbits, guinea
pigs, hamsters, farm animals (when used in biomedical research), and miscellaneous
other mammalian species.
Two public scandals involving animal research in 1981 and 1984 led to a public clamor
for more regulation, and two bills were passed by the U.S. Congress in 1985 that
amended the AWA and that addressed Public Health Service policies on animal research.
The text of the amended AWA and the associated regulations can be found on the
Internet at www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/awainfo.html. The law applies to any use of mammals
and birds in biomedical research, testing, and (post-secondary) education, regardless of
which government agency or private institution is funding the project. Research facilities
are not obligated to apply the AWA law or regulations to non -regulated species, nor
report statistics on the numbers of mice, rats and birds experiencing various levels of
adverse effects. USDA Policy 11 (see Appendix 1 or go to
www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/polmanpdf.html) provides guidance on reporting and addressing
animal pain and distress.
The second bill required the NIH to upgrade its requirements for animal research
oversight. This bill, the Health Research Extension Act (HREA), mostly addressed
Congressional reauthorization of the NIH, but one section contains animal welfare
provisions governing research. These provisions were implemented through revisions in
the Public Health Service (PHS) Policy on the Humane Care and Use of Laboratory
Animals. The Policy deals largely with administrative procedures, such as setting up an

Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC). The Policy calls upon research
facilities to follow the provisions in the Institute for Laboratory Animal Resources
(ILAR) Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. The ILAR Guide was
originally drafted (and periodically revised) for the NIH, so it is also known as the NIH
Guide. (Internet links to the full text of the Guide, the Policy, and the HREA can be
found at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/documentindex.htm).
The PHS Policy covers all vertebrate species, including rats, mice and birds, and
therefore fills some of the gaps in AWA oversight. However, the Policy applies only to
research funded by the PHS/NIH. It does not cover research funded by other sources, nor
does it typically apply to animals used in commercial testing nor for education. In
practice, most academic institutions apply the basic principles of the AWA and the PHS
policy to all of their vertebrate research, not bothering to make distinctions about species
coverage or the applicability of differing sets of oversight rules. However, some
institutions, because of the species used or their sources of research funding (e.g. a
biotech company using only mice and rats), are not subject to the AWA or the PHS
Policy at all, and are therefore completely unregulated.
A direct result of the 1985 amendments to the AWA and the changes in PHS policy that
occurred at around the same time was the establishment of the system of IACUCs. These
are modeled after the human research oversight committees, known as Institutional
Review Boards or IRBs. IACUCs have been specifically charged with reducing the pain
and distress that may be experienced by animals used in research as a major focus of their
activities. IACUCs review protocols submitted by Principal Investigators (PIs), and
evaluate the proposed standards of care provided to the animals used as subjects in the
study. IACUCs are also required (by the USDA regulators who oversee the conduct of
animal research) to ensure that investigators have searched for alternatives if the research
is likely to cause animal pain and distress, even if anesthetics and analgesics are used to
prevent any pain and distress (as mandated by Policy 12 - see
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/polmanpdf.html).
Investigators do not have to demonstrate that they have considered or looked for
alternatives if the animal research project is placed in the non-painful category. The
implicit message is that animal pain and distress is of greater public concern than animal
death (usually via euthanasia). Despite this regulatory emphasis on alleviating pain and
distress, the USDA has provided only relatively limited guidance for Policy 11 on the
topic. Studies involving toxic chemicals or pathogenic organisms are not listed as
examples of projects that might cause pain and distress. Also, the indications are that the
use of Policy 11 guidelines in AWA oversight is limited at best.
V. The System of Reporting Research Animal Pain and Distress in the U.S.
Each research facility using regulated animals is required to report annually to the USDA
the way its animals were used in research, with the numbers of animals placed in
different categories according to whether or not the animals were considered likely to

experience pain or distress and whether or not drugs were used to alleviate such pain and
distress.
The precise wording of each category is as follows:
•
•

•

Category C: Number of animals upon which teaching, research,
experiments, or tests were conducted involving no pain, distress or use of
pain-relieving drugs.
Category D: Number of animals upon which experiments, teaching,
research, surgery, or tests were conducted involving accompanying pain or
distress to the animals and for which appropriate anesthetic, analgesic or
tranquilizing drugs were used.
Category E: Number of animals upon which teaching, experiments,
research, surgery, or tests were conducted involving accompanying pain or
distress to the animals and for which the use of appropriate anesthetic,
analgesic or tranquilizing drugs would have adversely affected the
procedures, results or interpretation of the teaching, research, experiments,
surgery or tests. (An explanation of the procedures producing pain or
distress in these animals and the reasons such drugs were not used must be
attached to this report.).

The wording given for each category in Policy 11 is slightly different and is as follows
(modified to use same form as above):
•
•
•

Category C: Individual animals that do not experience pain/distress from
testing procedures.
Category D: Individual animals experiencing pain/distress which is
alleviated with anesthetics, analgesics, sedatives and/or tranquilizers. This
category includes terminal surgery under anesthesia.
Category E: Individual animals in which needed anesthetics, analgesics,
sedatives, and/or tranquilizers are withheld. For all column E animals, a
written justification, approved by the IACUC, must be provided, including
CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) references or other guidelines if
appropriate.

The actual wording on the Annual Report form provides an interesting legalistic loophole
which is being exploited by at least one research institution. A careful reading of
Columns D and E reveals that animals who experience pain and distress, and who do not
receive drug relief for reasons other than likely interference in the research, do not have a
classification category. Tulane University, the institution in question, has argued that it
has a policy of not approving any research project in which drugs could not be used to
alleviate pain and distress. Therefore, they argue, none of the animals in its research
projects could be placed in category E. They imply that all animals receive appropriate
treatment to alleviate significant pain and distress. We have queried this, especially in
cases where infection with pathogenic organisms has caused the deaths of monkeys. We
do not believe it is possible, even with the use of drugs (other than permanent general

anesthesia), to alleviate the distress associated with the animals progress towards death.
Also, the published reports in the scientific literature do not indicate any such use of
drugs to alleviate the distress due to the infectious disease.
None of the institutions in Louisiana have reported any animal use in category E since
1993, which is one of the reasons we first started looking closely at research papers
coming out of Louisiana. We do not believe that, under current approaches, it would be
possible to conduct a significant amount of research on regulated species without causing
some pain and distress that is not alleviated by drugs. Nationwide, 9.1% of the 1.214
million regulated animals used in 1998 were classified in category E and, in 1997, 8.0%
of 1.268 million animals. (About 35% are usually placed in Category D and 55% in
Category C.) The question that remains unanswered is whether these percentages are
accurate. According to the analysis below, The HSUS believes they are too low.
VI. Critique of the Current Reporting System of Animal Pain and Distress
The current USDA reporting scheme has been criticized on a number of grounds (e.g.
OTA, 1986).
A. For the first twenty years, there were no explicit definitions for "pain" and
"distress" and there is still not a definition for "distress", although the USDA is
now working to produce one.
B. The current pain and distress categories are confusing and there is no category
for procedures causing pain and distress that are partially, but not fully, alleviated
by the administration of drugs. In addition, there is no specific guidance on how
to complete the annual report forms. As a result, institutions interpret the forms in
their own ways. Thus, one institution might report a protocol in which the animals
receive anesthesia but experience some post-operative distress as a Category D
procedure (the animals received drugs) whereas another might interpret the same
procedure as Category E (the animals experienced distress).
C. For the following reasons, the information reported in the annual reports is far
from comprehensive, may be unreliable and needs to be interpreted with some
caution (e.g. Welsh, 1991).
1. Research facilities are not required to disclose their use of lab-bred rats
and mice, as well as any birds reptiles, amphibians and fish. Total use
figures for the United States can only be estimated. These groups of
animals account for an estimated 90% or more of all animal use.The NIH
reports mouse and rat use voluntarily and, in 1997, these two species
accounted for 97.4% of the 762,398 animals reported used.
2. The USDA reporting categories of "wild", "farm" and "other" animals
have changed since 1972 and cannot be used to track trends. The numbers
are now reported under the categories "farm" and "other."

3. Individual reports to the USDA vary in their thoroughness and
accuracy, and some institutions may not be included in the annual
compilation simply because their reports were turned in late. This problem
has been addressed in recent years and the Annual Reports are now more
complete and also more accurate.
4. An analysis of the annual statistics on animal use for any reporting year
reveals enormous (and unexplained) variation from state to state in the
reporting of animals used in painful procedures without the administration
of pain-relieving drugs. Table 3 documents the variation among states in
reporting column E use for 1996. There are some evident differences in
the types of research performed from state to state however, the variations
are much more likely to be due to differences in the way the USDA forms
are interpreted from state to state.
For comparison, the following states reported zero animals or less than 1% of the
animals in Column E from 1995-1998 (with total usage in parentheses): Alaska
(300), Arizona (5,000), Hawaii (5,000), Kentucky (500), Louisiana (16,800),
Maine (800), Mississippi (2,000), Nevada (3,000), Oklahoma (4,300), Oregon
(4,700), Rhode Island (2,100), South Carolina (6,100), Tennessee (10,900), Utah
(4,600), Vermont (1,100), Virginia (19,200), West Virginia (1,700), and
Wyoming (300). It is possible but unlikely that these numbers accurately reflect
the way that animals are used.
Table 3. USDA data from 1996 on Column E (unalleviated pain or distress)
use for states using more than 20,000 regulated animals.
% of Animals in
% of Animals in
State
State
Column E
Column E
USA

11.2

Missouri

15.7

California

3.2

Nebraska

10.7

Delaware

9.3

New Jersey

4.5

Georgia

13.9

New York

7.9

Illinois

3.2

North Carolina

8.0

Indiana

1.7

Ohio

4.9

Iowa

63.7

Pennsylvania

14.4

Kansas

40.2

Texas

1.9

Maryland

6.5

Virginia

0.5

Massachusetts 3.1

Washington

32.2

Michigan

2.8

Wisconsin

4.5

Minnesota

28.9

Federal Agencies 5.8

There are also curious variations within the same state over time. From 1983 to
1991, Virginia reported an average of 10-30% of the animals used in Column E
but for 1993, 1995 and 1996, the percentage in Column E was under 1%.
Arkansas reported little or no use of animals in Column E for a number of years,
and then in one year, 1993, there was a jump to 56.2%. For 1994, 1995, 1996 and
1997 the numbers bounced around from 21.3% to 0% to 0% and then back up to
35.5%.
For these and other reasons, many commentators have hesitated to draw firm
conclusions from the USDA figures (e.g., Orlans, 1993).
D. The determination of which category to place a scientific protocol is usually
done by the principal investigator (PI) under oversight from the IACUC prior to
the start of the research study. Some institutions do a post-hoc analysis to see if
their categorization is correct but, based on comments at meetings on IACUC
function, most do not. A retrospective assessment would provide much more
reliable numbers for the annual reports, and call greater attention to the
recognition of pain and distress as it is being experienced by the animals.
Although the USDA publishes only summary statistics on pain and distress, the agency
gathers considerably more information about column E procedures. Facilities are required
to submit not only information on the numbers of USDA-regulated species that fall into
column E, but also are required to describe the procedures themselves and explain why
pain- or distress-relieving drugs were withheld. The USDA does not disclose this
additional information in its annual reports but it can be obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act (FoIA).
According to an analysis by USDA Animal Care staff of the 1998 Category E reports, the
majority of the animals placed in category E (about 75%) are animals used in studies to
comply with mandated Federal testing requirements - particularly animal vaccine safety
and potency (unpublished USDA Report: Use of Animals in Research: A Study of
Animal Welfare Act 1998 Annual Report Forms, July 1999). Over 50% of all animals
placed in Category E were used to comply with regulations promulgated under the Virus,
Serum, Toxin Act (9 CFR) and administered by APHIS, the USDA division that also
oversees the AWA. Of the remainder, about 6.5% were used in disease studies, 3.3% in
antibody/serology projects, and 2.0% in pain studies. Approximately 80% of the animals
subjected to painful and/or distressing procedures were used by industry, with the
remaining numbers being split fairly evenly between government facilities and
universities/medical centers. Similar patterns have been documented for column E data
from 1992 (Stephens et al., 1998).
VII. Approaches by Other Countries to Reporting Pain and Distress
When compared to the percentage of classified painful experiments conducted in foreign
countries, the United States' numbers for research that causes pain or distress are
significantly lower (see Table 4).

Table 4. Comparison of reported pain and distress numbers for four countries
% Experiencing Moderate to
Country (Year)
Total Animal Use
Severe Pain and/or Distress
Canada (1996)

1,758,416

28.8

The Netherlands (1994) 770, 888

46.0

Switzerland (1997)

492, 186

30.2

United States (1997)

1,267,828

8.0

In Great Britain, the only indication of pain control that is available is the recording of
anesthesia use. In 1978, 3% of the 5.2 million procedures involved anesthesia for the
whole procedure (they were terminal) and 14% involved anesthesia for only part of the
procedure. In 1988, 19% of the 3.5 million procedures involved anesthesia for the whole
procedure and 17% involved anesthesia for only part of the procedure. It is not clear why
anesthesia use doubled from 1978 to 1988 although the 1986 Act that revised British
controls over animal experimentation placed greater emphasis on the control of pain and
distress (The Alternatives Report, 1990). In 1997, 35.9% of animal procedures used
anesthesia for some or all of the experiment. By comparison, in the USA, about 35% of
all animals are placed in Category D (use of drugs to alleviate pain and/or distress,
including anesthesia)
The Netherlands has made a concerted attempt to classify its research animal use by pain
category. The 1994 Annual Report on animal experimentation notes that 54% of the
animals experienced minor discomfort, 26% were likely to experience moderate
discomfort and 20% were likely to experience severe discomfort. About one fifth of the
animals in this last category were given medication to alleviate pain but they were still
considered to be in discomfort (discomfort and distress is not always alleviated by
analgesics). Examples of procedures that would place animals in the "severe" category
are prolonged deprivation of food or water, some experimental infections, tumor
induction, LD50 testing and immunization in the foot pad with complete Freund's
adjuvant (The Alternatives Report, 1992).
The Canadians provide information on the use of anesthesia by different categories of
research (see Table 5). The percentages can be compared with the fifty largest (in terms
of NIH funding received) non-profit research institutions in the United States. The
Canadians report that 13.25% of the animals used in basic research experienced moderate
to severe pain. By contrast, the US research institutions reported a total of only 0.6% of
animals used in 1996 and 0.8% of animals used in 1997 experiencing pain and distress
(see Appendix II). In 1997, the NIH Annual Report identified only 0.7% of 23,958
regulated animals in Category E. We do not believe that the differences between Canada
and the United States are real and suggest that this represents more evidence of
significant under-reporting of animal pain and distress.

Table 5. Canadian Pain Classification Statistics 1996 (x 1000)
Pain and
Basic
Applied
Safety
Drug
distress
Total
Education
Research
Research
Testing
Development
-Grade
B (none)

542

333

52

70

29

58

C (Min)

709

537

95

56

11

11

D (Mod/Sev) 414

120

116

147

29

2

E (Severe)

93

13

5.5

74

0

0.3%

TOTAL

1,758 1,003

268

348

69

71

%D

23.6% 12.0%

43.3%

42.3%

42.3%

3.4%

%E

5.3% 1.3%

2.0%

21.4%

0.0%

0.4%

63.7%

42.3%

3.8%

%D+E
28.9% 13.3%
45.3%
Source: 1996 CCAC Animal Use Survey

It could be argued that the Canadian statistics include research done on mice, rats, birds
and fish and that these animals are likely to experience much more pain and distress than
the species regulated by the USDA. The Swiss have broken out the data on pain and
distress by species (see Table 6). A similar classification of the US data is presented in
Table 7. It does not appear as though the patterns of pain categorization for the different
species are sufficiently large to account for the large differences in the percentage of
animals reported to be experiencing pain and distress between the United States and the
other countries.
Table 6. Swiss Pain Classification Statistics 1997
Pain / Distress Grade None - Minor Moderate Severe % Severe % Moderate + Severe
Mice

190.847

67,689

22,913 8.1

32.3

Rats

101.013

35, 199

8,617 5.9

30.3

Guinea Pigs

10,610

3,471

1,610 10.3

32.4

Dogs

1,383

20

9

0.6

14.4

Pigs

2,116

190

23

1.0

9.1

Primates

334

77

28

6.4

31.4

Rabbits

4,660

1,455

72

1.2

24.7

TOTAL
343,3885
112,351 36,450 7.4
30.2
Source: Statistik 1997; Tierversuche in der Schweiz; Bundesamt fur Veterinarwesen
(Department of Veterinary Affairs); 3003 Liebefeld, Bern

Table 7. United States Pain Classification Statistics 1997
Total
E
%E
Dogs

75,429

1,671

2.2

Cats

26,091

378

1.45

Primates

56,381

840

1.49

Guinea Pigs 272,797

37,799 13.86

Hamsters

217,079

46,238 21.30

Rabbits

309,322

9,866

3.12

Sheep

33,048

72

0.22

Pigs

73,995

1,658

2.24

Other

203,686

2,638

1.30

TOTAL
1,267,828 101,160 7.98
Source: 1997 USDA Animal Welfare Report
VIII. Types of Research Causing Pain and Distress
Pain and distress caused by specific research models and techniques raise serious
concerns for those in the animal welfare community as well as in the scientific
community. For example, an animal's pain and/or distress is almost certain to affect
experimental results in ways that are not necessarily predictable. The control groups are
unlikely to experience the same degree of discomfort and distress as the experimental
animals. Therefore, discomfort and distress have the potential to skew research results.
Good estimates of how much animal pain and/or animal distress is caused by particular
techniques or methods (with empirical evidence to support the estimates) are not yet
available. For this very reason, gathering data to discriminate amongst research models
and specific techniques is essential. Additionally, pain and distress may be specific to a
particular research model, species, or gender and may affect the extent of suffering
caused in that particular animal model (e.g., tumor site and burden).
According to the USDA statistics, animal use is split almost evenly between commercial
and non-commercial users (Welsh, 1991; Newman, 1989) although these analyses leave
out the federal laboratories which account for somewhere between 15-20% of national
laboratory animal use. It seems as though the ratio between commercial, non-commercial
and government laboratories in the USA may be around 45:40:15. In Great Britain,
commercial laboratories have accounted for around two-thirds of the animal use with
educational institutions and government laboratories splitting the remainder (Rowan, et
al., 1995).
Of the 73,822 animals reported in 1992 experiencing pain and distress in testing
procedures, vaccine potency testing alone accounted for 55%. Guinea pigs and hamsters
involved in Column E procedures accounted for the majority (95%) of the animals used
in vaccine potency testing. The remaining animals were involved in the heterogeneous
category of toxicity or safety tests. Unfortunately, Column E descriptions typically are

too brief and generalized to permit a more detailed analysis of the procedures involved
(Stephens, et al., 1998).
Much attention has been focused on the use of animals in the testing of personal care and
household products although such use probably accounts for much less than one percent
of the national demand for laboratory animals. In Great Britain, the testing of personal
care and household products accounted for less than 5,000 animal procedures in 1990, or
around 0.15% of total animal use. Among commercial organizations, the vast majority of
animal use is involved in the discovery, development and testing of new medicines and
therapeutics.
Specific Techniques
A preliminary list of research models/research areas has been compiled (see Table 8) and
divided into two categories depending on whether the ensuing distress is the result of pain
or the result of fear, anxiety, discomfort, illness or some other adverse effect. There are
overlaps, yet the distinction serves to draw attention to the relatively neglected issue of
anxiety and fear in research animals.
Table 8. Areas of Research and Specific Techniques that Cause Pain-Induced and
Non-Pain Induced Distress
SPECIFIC RESEARCH MODELS OR AREAS
Non-Pain-Induced Distress
aggression models
anxiety models (e.g., Vogel conflict-drinking model)
cancer (tumor burden, cachexia, therapy, carcinogenicity testing)
depression models (e.g., learned helplessness, forced swimming, infant separation)
diabetes models
drug addiction and withdrawal models
environmental stress models (e.g., hot, cold)
fear models
immunological research (e.g., vaccine potency testing)
infectious disease
motion sickness models
nutrition research
panic models
pharmacology (some) (e.g., Tumor Necrosis Factor, capsaicin research)
psychopathology (other than anxiety, fear, depression, etc., mentioned above)
radiation research
stress models (psychological)
toxicology (induced effects)
transgenic research
Pain-Induced Distress
arthritis models
burn research
cancer research (tumor pain)

chronic pain studies (acute pain should not be a problem if IASP* guidelines followed)
inflammation studies
experimental surgery
muricide as a model of aggression, neophobia, etc.
orthopedic studies
trauma research
SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES
anesthesia after-effects
antibody production (polyclonal and monoclonal)
aversive stimuli (e.g. electric shock)
bleeding techniques (including retro-orbital bleeding)
Complete Freund's Adjuvant
control animals denied experimental treatments
deprivation limits (e.g., water, food, sleep or social partners/experiences)
dosing techniques (e.g., gavage)
granuloma techniques
gut loop studies
knock-out technology
surgery sequelae
CO2 anesthesia for rodents
*IASP: Report of International Association for the Study of Pain; subcommittee on
taxonomy.
IX. Recognition and Alleviation of Pain and Distress: Problems and Technical
Issues
The HSUS recognizes that the systematic reduction of animal pain and distress in the
research laboratory is obviously not a trivial task. First, there is much conceptual
confusion in the use of such terms as pain, distress and suffering. Second, animal use in
the laboratory and classroom is very varied. Nonetheless, while the techniques used in
biomedical research are certainly numerous, it is certainly not beyond our scope to
determine underlying principles of pain and distress in animals which can then be applied
to the varied models and methods. Third, animal pain, distress and suffering are not easy
to recognize or measure unambiguously and there is considerable opportunity for
legitimate disagreement among scientists.
Terminology
Aversive or distressing stimuli can take a variety of forms. Some are physiological
stressors (e.g. injury, surgery, disease, starvation and dehydration), some are
psychological stressors (e.g. situations that induce fear, boredom, anxiety), and some are
environmental stressors (e.g. restraint, excessive noise, the presence of people or other
species and chemicals) and some are a mixture of stressors (ILAR, 1992). There are
difficulties in assessing the severity of resulting adverse states. This, however, is a task
that must be addressed.

The terms "pain", "distress", "anxiety", "fear" and "suffering" describe experiences, and
responses to experiences that are, in most cases, unpleasant and hence undesirable. Such
terms are commonly used in everyday language to describe both human and animal
experiences. However, the difficulty lies in understanding exactly what is meant when we
actually use such terms. Dictionary definitions are often circular and unhelpful. For
example, in the 1967 unabridged Random House Dictionary, pain is defined as both a
sensation of acute physical hurt or discomfort and as emotional suffering and distress.
Suffering is then defined as undergoing pain or distress. The Random House and other
dictionaries appear to view pain, distress, and suffering as synonyms. However, a closer
analysis reveals that this assumption is not supported (see Table 9 for definitions of
relevant terms.)
Table 9. Definitions of Pain and Distress Terms
NOCICEPTION- The process whereby potentially noxious and/or tissue damaging
stimuli cause special receptors (nociceptors) to fire and send a nerve impulse along the
nociceptive pathways. Pain perception may occur, but only when such nerve impulses are
processed in the central nervous system. Pain perception is not a necessary part of
nociception.
PAIN - An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage or described in terms of such damage (IASP, 1979). Pain terms
are very variable and people may talk of acute or chronic pain, or sharp or dull pain, for
example. Pain is neither solely physical nor psychological, it is both.
ANXIETY - An emotional state involving increased arousal and alertness prompted by an
unknown danger that may be present in the immediate environment (Kitchen et al.,
1987).Unlike pain, anxiety is a diffuse sensation that has no specific location in the body.
Scientists who study anxiety have not developed a code of conduct to limit the extent of
anxiety a non-human animal may experience and some assume that animals do not
experience anxiety, although some effective anti-anxiety drugs have been discovered and
studied in animal models.
FEAR - An emotional state involving increased arousal and alertness prompted by an
experienced or known danger present in the immediate environment (Kitchen et al.,
1987).
DISTRESS - A state in which the organism is unable to escape from acute stressors or
adapt to an altered external or internal environment. In acute distress, the organism will
try to escape but in chronic distress, the organism will commonly engage in maladaptive
(e.g. learned helplessness) behaviors (cf. ILAR, 1992).
SUFFERING - A highly unpleasant emotional response usually associated with pain
and/or distress. (Kitchen et al., 1987). The adjective "emotional" stresses the affective
nature of suffering. Suffering involves a threat to the "person-hood" or self-concept of an
individual rather than simply to the organic body and is a metaphysical concept. It
cannot be reduced to "operational" terms and is, thus, not easily incorporated into
"objective" sciences.
Most of the literature discussion about animal pain and suffering concentrates on pain,
not suffering. A report from the Netherlands, entitled the "Definitions of Pain, Stress and
Suffering and the Use of These Concepts in Legislation on Animal Suffering," has almost

no discussion of suffering itself although the term comes up frequently in the text
(Voorzanger and de Cock Buning, 1988). The report on animal pain and distress by the
Institute for Laboratory Animal Resources (ILAR, 1992) defines and discusses pain,
distress, anxiety, fear and discomfort but deliberately excludes any discussion of animal
suffering. For the ILAR working party, suffering could not be defined operationally and
therefore could not be reliably assessed. Like the term "obscenity", people are confident
they can recognize suffering when they see it, but they cannot define what it is. Pain is
also a very complex and private phenomenon, but is nevertheless considered easier to
measure and to ground in the empirical world of biomedical research.
In biomedical research, animals may experience pain, discomfort, anxiety, and fear in
addition to functional deficits caused by experimental procedures. In most experimental
protocols, an animal's pain may be treated with anesthesia and analgesics. These
measures may relieve or even eliminate the experience of pain. To date, however, there
are no similarly well known methods to alleviate the distress, anxiety, and fear an animal
is subject to before, during, or after experimental procedures. In some experimental
protocols, anesthesia or analgesics are thought likely to interfere with the results and are
therefore not used, leaving the animal with persistent and unrelieved pain. There is both a
an animal welfare and a scientific need to understand animal distress and fear, and their
relationship to pain.
Assessing Pain
Typically, we resort to observations of non-verbal behavior, such as moaning and crying,
writhing, wriggling and so on to infer the presence of pain perceptions in animals. Pain
also has typical physiological and neurophysiological correlates which, unlike the
phenomenological (or felt) occurrence that is pain, are subject to direct empirical
investigation. For example, nociceptors (the nerve endings that, when stimulated, are
associated with pain perceptions) have been found in all mammals and in other
vertebrates. In addition, direct, percutaneous recordings in human subjects have
demonstrated that feelings of pain are correlated with activity in the small myelinated (Adelta) and unmyelinated (C) nerves. Research on anesthetized mammals indicates that
these same nerve fibers are activated exclusively (or most potently) by stimuli of noxious
intensity. Such nerve fibers appear to be present in all vertebrates. Similarities between
humans and animals have also been demonstrated in the central nervous system pathways
involved in pain perception.
Thus, reasoning from analogy, from neuroanatomy, from neurophysiology, from
neurochemistry, as well as from behavioral observations, most people conclude that
animals, or at the very least the warm-blooded vertebrates, probably experience pain that
is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to that experienced by humans. The USDA
guidelines on pain in animals state that if one has reason to believe that a stimulus would
be painful to humans, it should also be regarded as painful to animals.

Anxiety and Distress
Pain researchers have paid considerable attention to the use of limited levels of painful
stimuli in animals. For example, the International Association for the Study of Pain
(IASP) has set up guidelines in which researchers are urged to design only projects in
which animals are given the opportunity to terminate any painful stimulus and thus
control the level of pain they experience (IASP, 1979). Some of the simpler pain research
protocols (e.g. the tail flick and hot plate tests) involve systems where the animals makes
the choice to end the pain by moving themselves or their tail away from the stimulus. The
tail flick and hot plate devices are also fitted with automatic cutoff switches so that, in the
event the analgesia under study is very effective, the animal will still not suffer any tissue
damage.
Similarly, one can develop systems that allow animals to "volunteer" for pain research by
offering them a highly desired food or drink. Such animals are willing to accept some
painful stimuli in order to gain the reward. However, at the pain tolerance threshold, they
voluntarily choose not to participate any further. Primates appear to have very similar
tolerance thresholds to humans. In all of the above cases, the research protocol allows the
animal to control when the painful stimulus is terminated. There are some studies (e.g. of
chronic pain) where such refinements are not possible but even here pain researchers
have tried to ensure that the animals do not endure a significant level of pain (Casey and
Dubner, 1989).
By contrast, researchers who study anxiety in animals, which is arguably just as, if not
more distressing to animals, have not developed similar guidelines and approaches. Some
may not have paid attention to animal anxiety because they do not believe that animals
can be anxious although they can experience the more "primitive" emotion of fear (e.g.
Cassano, 1983). It is not exactly clear what the difference might be between fear and
anxiety. One might fear some definable danger whereas anxiety may refer to that state of
uneasiness where the threat is undefined and elusive. However, there is at least one
relatively clearly defined neural substrate that appears to be involved in mediating
anxious states and this substrate was, interestingly, found to be present in all vertebrates
but in none of the invertebrates examined. This substrate has come to be known as the
benzodiazepine receptor because it binds the anxiolytic benzodiazepine drugs such as
valium with high affinity. It also binds alcohol and the barbiturate drugs which diminish
feelings of anxiety as well.
Building on investigations of drug binding to the benzodiazepine receptor and its
subsequent behavioral effects, Gray (1982) has produced a comprehensive theory of
anxiety in which he argues that "...'human anxiety', or something very like it, exists also
in animals ...." Gray suggests that many people may find this conclusion hard to accept.
This is because of the common belief that anxiety is an almost uniquely human state,
dependent on such complex cognitive capacities as the ability to anticipate future events
based on past experiences, to form a self image, or to imagine one's own mortality.
Nevertheless, he argues that the observed effects of such anti-anxiety drugs as alcohol,
the barbiturates, and the benzodiazepines in animals are so similar to the observed effects

of these same drugs in humans that it seems more parsimonious to argue that these agents
act upon a state in animals that is similar to the human state of anxiety.
Research has also identified anxiety-causing compounds that bind to the benzodiazepine
receptor in the central nervous system. The best known of these are the beta-carbolines
which, when administered to humans cause intense inner strain and excitation, increased
blood pressure and pulse, restlessness, increased stress hormone levels in the blood and
stereotyped rocking motions. One human volunteer experienced such severe anxiety that
he had to be physically restrained and injected with a benzodiazepine which provided
relief within five minutes (Dorow et al, 1983). The administration of beta-carbolines to
primates caused piloerection, struggling in the restraint chair, increased blood pressure
and pulse, increased stress hormone levels in the blood and increased vocalization and
urination (Ninan et al., 1983).
The similar reactions of human volunteers and primates to the beta-carbolines does not
prove that both humans and primates experience the same sort of anxiety but it is hard to
argue that animal "anxiety" is not a significant cause of animal distress and suffering.
Gray (1982) has suggested that "anxiety" may have evolved from a biological behavioral
system - the 'behavioral inhibition system' (BIS). BIS may confer an evolutionary
advantage by stimulating a state of alertness to novel stimuli in an animal's environment,
making the animal less likely to rush into danger. Excessive stimulation of the BIS can
clearly cause animal distress and suffering, as exemplified by a strain of "nervous"
pointer dogs (Reese, 1979). The distress (immobility, urination and defecation) in the
nervous pointers caused by the presence of humans could be easily eliminated by
appropriate drug therapy, suggesting that the problem might have been due to mutations
in the pathways controlling the "anxiety/fear" response.
While the distribution of the benzodiazepine receptor in vertebrates appears to provide a
relatively "clean" distinction between "sentient" vertebrates and "non-sentient"
invertebrates, research over the past decade has produced a host of confounding factors.
First, there are other benzodiazepine binding sites which have now been shown to be
present in invertebrates (Lummis, 1990). These "receptors" are found in non-nervous
tissue and they are different from those found in the central nervous system of
vertebrates. Second, a variety of other receptors that mediate anxiety and other anxiolytic
drugs have been identified. For example, cholecystokinin peptides and their receptors
appear to be involved in mediating anxiety and panic (Derrien et al., 1994). Handley and
McBlane (1993) describe a number of drugs including the increasingly popular
anxiolytic, buspirone, that act through 5HT(serotonin)-receptors to mediate "anxiety" in
both humans and animals. Thus, anxiety cannot be attributed to a single neurochemical
system in the central nervous system. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear from the
pharmacology of anxiety in both animals and humans that anxiety can be a significant
cause of distress and suffering in animals.
Distress and Suffering
Distress is functionally and physiologically distinct from pain, although the two may

often interact on a cognitive-emotional level. Distress involves the activation of neural
pathways in the limbic system of the brain that process emotional response to pain, fear
and anxiety. Distress itself is used as a qualifying, catch-all term for multiple negative
states which precludes the opportunity to quantify this subjective state of being. In
humans, verbal answers to specific questions can, in most circumstances, be provided but
the human subject may still be concealing his/her internal states (hence the uncertainty of
lie detector tests). Animals are non-verbal and cannot similarly express and describe their
feelings. Consequently, distress may be measured only by external standards. Given this
limitation, and the relatively small degree of attention given to understanding the welfare
implications of stress in animals, there are currently few methods that are applied in
identifying and reducing the distress caused to animals in research.
Pain, fear, anxiety, discomfort and distress are all negative subjective states of being, and
are typically described and grouped together under one larger heading of "suffering".
"Suffering" is a widely used and abused colloquial term that has been subjected to very
little careful analysis, even in the case of human suffering. Cassell (1982), one of the few
to address the biological and psychological roots of human suffering, argues that
suffering occurs when the integrity of a person (not the body) is perceived to be
compromised or threatened in some way. (Person-hood is defined in terms of an
individual's mental life and is distinguished from the organic body). Damage to organic
tissues can and often does lead to suffering but, for Cassell, it is the psychological
reaction to such damage that is the key to understanding the idea of suffering.
The notion that suffering arises from a perceived threat to the integrity of a "person" has
significant ramifications for any discussion of animal suffering. Animals would,
according to the above definition, suffer only if they possess to some degree the qualities
of person-hood. In a later analysis, in which he specifically addresses the issue of animal
suffering, Cassell (1989) (and more recently Byrne, 1999) argues that only beings with a
sense of the future (anticipation) and a sense of self are capable of experiencing suffering.
Some animals do appear to have a sense of self (e.g. chimpanzees and other great apes)
and a sense of the future or, at least, seem to be able to anticipate and reflect on future
events. How far such abilities extend through the animal kingdom would necessitate a
much more detailed analysis than is possible here. One could also argue that only animals
that are capable of affective (e.g. emotional) responses might be included among the
category of beings capable of suffering (Damasio, 1994).
It is quite clear that few, if any, people use suffering in the narrower sense articulated
above - referring only to perceived threats to the "person" rather than simple vigilance to
protect against threats to the non-reflective organism. Even scientists who object to using
the term "suffering" when referring to animal distress will, nevertheless, still argue
vehemently that animals (including invertebrates) are capable of suffering. However, the
colloquial term "suffering" has such broad meaning that it cannot be used profitably
(even after careful definition) when trying to assess the severity of aversive stimuli to
animals, or even to discuss the level of distress experienced by animals.

The Relationship Between Pain, Fear, Anxiety, Distress and Suffering
In order to understand the underlying reasons for animal suffering and to alleviate its
occurrence in laboratory animals, we must first examine its components. In the model
presented in Figure 1, pain, fear, anxiety and discomfort are all aspects of the external,
behavioral manifestation of underlying processes. For instance, a painful stimulus applied
during an experimental procedure, given its intensity, duration and frequency of
application, may lead to anxiety and fear. The animal comes to expect (predict) the
arrival of the painful stimuli and therefore develops anxious and fearful reactions to any
prior stimuli that are linked in time and space to the onset of pain. The sight of the
hypodermic needle approaching, causing an animal to cringe, is one example. This
cascade of cognitive-emotional responses can be termed 'distress'.
The cognitive-emotional filter through which an animal perceives its subjective
experiences of the external world will in turn influence its internal states of being. If the
animal perceives that the onset of pain is to be expected, perhaps on a daily or hourly
schedule, it may suffer emotionally from the anticipation or expectation of the pain. In
this case, the animal's emotional state and behavioral response may extend beyond its
initial responses to the degree of pain inflicted by the original stimuli. Thus, the negative
emotional states experienced by the animal may not only contribute to but increase its
sensitivity to the painful stimuli it anticipates.
The well-studied state of "learned helplessness", which occurs in both human and nonhuman animals, illustrates the point that cognitive-emotional suffering may be even more
intolerable to an animal than the physical infliction of pain. Animals in states of severe
suffering may display learned helplessness in which they typically show no response or
attempts to withdraw or protect themselves from mildly painful or harmful stimuli.
Humans who display learned helplessness are typically individuals who have been
subjected to various forms of physical and mental or emotional abuse. This gives an idea
of the perceived events that an animal has experienced to reach the stated of learned
helplessness.

Figure 1. Model of Pain, Distress, Anxiety, and Suffering

To lessen the potential slide downward of captive animals' behavioral and
mental/emotional states into boredom, frustration, depression and finally severe apathy
(learned helplessness), it is necessary to provide both social and physical environmental
enrichment (see Wemelsfelder,1999, for a discussion of this topic). Some aspects of
enrichment involve rewarding and reinforcing social, physical, and other environmental
stimuli. Promoting well being, however is not quite as simple as providing a "likable"
experience. If an animal is provided with food and water in a safe environment, why do
we not consider this necessarily sufficient to maintain a state of well-being (see
Shepherdson, 1999, for a discussion of this issue)? Experiments indicate that captive
animals will preferentially work for food rather than eat what is freely available,
indicating that foraging activity is itself rewarding (contra freeloading: see Young, 1999).
Play behavior is certainly associated in humans with well being and pleasure, but how
would we increase the incidence of such behavior in captive animals? In fact, while we
may think we know play when we see it, behavioral scientists argue endlessly over how
to define animal play and what such behavior might mean (see Mitchell, 1990).
Anthropologists and sociologists recognize that certain tasks carried out by human beings
involve psychic costs to those human beings. Working in an animal slaughter plant would
be very unpleasant for most people. In some cultures, slaughter is conducted by people of
particular spiritual development and strength (e.g. the schochet in kosher slaughter) that
permits them to bear the burden of taking the life of a sentient creature. Hunter/gatherer
societies have rituals that help the hunters cope with the burden or guilt of killing an

animal. Similarly, the taking of an animal's life in a research project or the infliction of
pain and suffering on laboratory animals causes burdens that must either be continuously
confronted or repackaged in certain customs and habits (e.g. the "sacrifice" of
"numbered" and un-named animals) in order to make the burdens more bearable (Arluke,
1988 & 1989). Such laboratory conventions and customs allow caring people to do the
research despite the harm caused to the millions of sentient animals used every year.
(Lest those of us who are not involved in animal research become too smug, it should be
noted that eight billion animals are raised and slaughtered in the United States each year,
under living conditions that range from poor to horrendous, to satisfy the demands of
90% or more of the public for hamburgers, spare ribs and chicken wings.)
The problem with the development of "distancing mechanisms" is that distance can lead
to people ignoring or overlooking costs that, with more attention, could be alleviated or
avoided altogether. Human neonatal surgery is a classic example of the danger of such
distancing mechanisms. While most humans can report whether or not they feel pain,
animals cannot and this has led to problems in acknowledging animal pain (see Beynen et
al., 1987 and Phillips, 1994 for examples). Non-verbal human infants were, until recently,
also denied the capacity to fully experience pain, confirming the importance of verbal
report in legitimating pain perception (Anand et al., 1987). According to Daniel Tibboel
(Personal communication - November, 1998, Zeist), in 1987 it was found that 85% of
neonatal anesthesiologists agreed that human infants could experience pain but only 5%
actually delivered pain relief. By 1996, 85% were giving pain relief. Thus, drawing
attention to the issue of infant pain had a dramatic effect on the delivery of pain relief. It
is also possible to study pain perception in animals using the same sort of techniques and
reasoning by analogy as in human infants.
The fact that human neonates could not speak and describe their feelings was probably a
contributing factor to the overlooking of neonatal pain and suffering. Similarly, The
HSUS believes that a not insignificant amount of the pain and distress of non-verbal
laboratory animals is overlooked and/or its severity discounted. There is only one
research study that looked specifically at this issue (Phillips, 1994) and it confirmed the
suspicion that animal pain and distress are not addressed as vigorously as they should be.
X. HSUS Pain & Distress Initiative
For the most part, our ability to detect pain, and more importantly, distress, in laboratory
animals is very limited. We lack good measures and methods for quantifying distress in
the common laboratory animal species. To address this lack of knowledge and our
inability to generate objective measures of negative subjective states, and to promote
laboratory animal welfare, The HSUS has launched a campaign to eliminate pain and
distress in laboratory animals by the year 2020. It is apparent that those who use and care
for laboratory animals are already concerned about animal pain and distress. In
conjunction with IACUCs, they have played a significant role in addressing problems of
animal pain and distress in the past ten to fifteen years. Nevertheless, The HSUS believes
that a more systematic approach will hasten achievement of the campaign goal.

The HSUS Pain & Distress Initiative consists of the following four components:
1. Development of a detailed, referenced technical report on animal pain and
distress: The HSUS has convened an international group of experts including
laboratory animal veterinarians, animal behaviorists, physiologists, neurologists,
veterinary anesthesiologists, philosophers and others to develop and author a
comprehensive report on the subject. The group is chaired by Dr Joy Mench of
the University of California, Davis and the report is due to be completed this year.
The group is having particular difficulty in developing guidelines to address the
likely distress that specific research techniques might cause since the empirical
data is buried in the literature and not easy to find.
2. The topics that this pain and distress working group will cover in the technical
report are:
• Definitions of animal pain, distress, discomfort, anxiety, fear and suffering
• The biology of pain and distress
• Recognition of animal pain and distress: current and potential approaches
• Alleviation of animal pain and distress
• Housing issues
• Pain and distress caused by specific techniques and research endpoints
• Conclusion and recommendations
• Appendices
3. Outreach to Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs):
The HSUS is reaching out to seek the co-operation and collaboration of the
scientific community--those who will ultimately develop the techniques and
implement the approaches that will make animal research pain- and distress-free.
Specifically, The HSUS has invited IACUCs, which already have a statutory
mandate to minimize pain and distress, to join in the Initiative.
The HSUS has begun facilitating an exchange of information and policies among
IACUCs so that new ideas and initiatives, including "best practices" and humane
endpoints (ILAR, 2000), can be disseminated quickly. We have sent five mailings
to the chairs of the over 1800 IACUCs nationwide through March, 2000. The
mailings are primarily informational in nature, alerting IACUC chairs to
upcoming meetings and new publications, as well as informing them about the
Pain and Distress Initiative. Feedback from IACUC chairs has been minimal, but
responses from a survey in one of the mailings indicated that over 90% of the
(few) respondents found the mailings helpful and wanted to continue receiving
them.
As part of our efforts to raise the profile of pain and distress issues with IACUCs,
The HSUS will focus on specific research areas, practices, and techniques where
relatively little attention has been given to animal suffering. Our aim is to seek out
new approaches to recognizing, measuring, and alleviating animal distress. We
have commissioned the development of a report on weight loss as an index of

animal pain or distress and have also begun to research whether CO2, a widely
used agent for the anesthesia and euthanasia of rats and mice, is aversive and
causes significant distress to the animals.
4. Regulatory Aspects
The HSUS supports a proposal to alter pain and distress reporting under the
Animal Welfare Act that would discriminate between the following levels:
• no/little pain/distress,
• moderate pain/distress, and
• severe pain/distress.
While waiting for the possible implementation of a new reporting scheme, The
HSUS seeks to develop some consistency in how pain and distress are currently
reported (see Section XI).

We will encourage the development and issuing of "best practice" guidelines
covering specific techniques and research areas so that the many different
IACUCs have some base line guidance for their own decision-making. An
example of such an initiative is the letter sent out by the Office for the Protection
from Research Risks at NIH (now renamed as the Office for Laboratory Animal
Welfare) stating that ascites antibody production in rodents causes distress and
should be used only if in vitro production of monoclonal antibodies is
unsuccessful.
5. Financial Support for Research on pain and distress
One of the problems in the field of pain or distress measurement and elimination
is that there is virtually no funding to support relevant studies. Clearly there are
difficulties in encouraging agencies to provide funds for projects that might
deliberately cause animal distress. However, it should be possible to "piggy-back"
such assessments onto ongoing studies that are investigating other topics that have
already been approved. The HSUS plans to lobby both private and government
entities to make available funds that might be used to develop more sensitive and
accurate measures of animal distress that are practical in the laboratory and ways
in which such distress can be alleviated.
Best Practices and Policies
Many institutions and animal facilities have developed policies and guidelines in which
the pain and distress caused to animals are minimized or alleviated entirely. These
documents are usually only available in-house (although the world-wide web is making
some inroads in this regard since more and more internal policy documents can be
accessed by people outside the institution) and are not disseminated to other institutions
and laboratories through professional publications. The HSUS plans to promote the
dissemination of best practices by encouraging institutions to publicize their efforts on
reducing pain and distress in animals used in research.

An analysis of some of the policies covering specific techniques indicates that there is
considerable variation in what is permitted from one institution to another. The HSUS has
summarized some of the policies on specific techniques and is distributing some of these
analyses to the IACUCs via our periodic mailings. We have begun the process with an
analysis of policies on the production of monoclonal antibodies gathered from the World
Wide Web (see Table 10). The question is, which one of these policies causes less pain
and distress to the animals, and what can be considered to be a 'best practice'? It is clear
that more inter-institutional discussion and empirical studies are needed to assist
scientists in making a determination on this and other policies.
Table 10. Analysis of Policies on the Production of Monoclonal Antibodies
Penn State
Stanford
U Iowa
U Minnesota
Monitoring subj. w/
Not specified
solid tumors

3/ wk

Not specified

3/ wk
0.5 ml max
pristane

Priming

as low as 0.1
ml pristane

Not specified

0.2 ml max
pristane

# of taps

max 3 taps,
last terminal

Not specified

2 taps, last after
Not specified
euthanasia

Monitoring post
inoculation

daily

3/ wk for 1st wk,
then daily

daily

daily

Replacement fluid
after ascite harvest

Not specified

1-2 ml of saline
subcutaneous

Not specified

Not specified

Anesthesia during
anesthesia can anesthesia used for
Not specified Not specified
tap
be used
new personnel
* Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee policies on the production of
monoclonal antibodies were retrieved from the World Wide Web. Policies were
reviewed and organized into a table for the purpose of comparing similarities and
differences among institutions. The table depicts a variety of policies for monoclonal
antibody production.

XI. Recommendations and Proposals
The current USDA pain categories (Table 11) have been widely criticized by scientists
and animal protectionists alike (see Section V of the White Paper). Table 12 presents a
proposal for a modified system that is a true pain scale similar to those used in other
countries, such as The Netherlands and Switzerland. This scale has been developed and
approved by an eight member committee consisting of animal research and animal
protection organizations. The USDA has yet to take action on the proposal.
Table 11. Current USDA Reporting Scheme
USDA
Pain
Full
Anesthesia/Analgesia
Category and/orDistress
IACUCReview

Alternatives
Literature Search

C

Minor or None No

Maybe

No

D

1

Yes

Yes

Yes or No

Yes

E
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
1
Animals listed in column D were given pain- or distress-relieving drugs, but these drugs
may not have been sufficient to relieve all pain and distress throughout the experiment.
The USDA could implement the new system so that protocols with little or no pain or
distress (including those where pain and distress are completely alleviated by anesthesia
and analgesia) could be exempt from alternatives literature searches and full IACUC
review.
Table 12. The Proposed Reporting Scheme
Pain
Full IACUC
Category
Anesthesia/Analgesia
and/orDistress
Review

Alternatives
Literature Search

I

Minor or None

No

No

No

II

Minor or None

Yes

Perhaps

Perhaps

III

Moderate

Yes or No

Yes

Yes

IV
Severe
Yes or No
Yes
Yes
Until a new pain classification system is implemented, there are a number of ways that
the USDA could improve the current system, such as:
•
•
•
•
•

increasing facility compliance and oversight of the "requirements" to provide
descriptions of Column E procedures and explanations for withholding pain and
distress relief
increasing the level of detail in Column E descriptions to enable reviewers to
create a more detailed classification of experimental procedures
creating a mandate for facilities to provide year end totals and summaries of all
protocols using animals in Column E for examination by USDA inspectors
providing IACUCs with clear definitions and examples of levels of suffering,
pain, distress, stress, and anxiety
clearly defining when animals and studies must be classified into Column E

•
•
•
•

clarifying what "pain" and "distress" (especially distress) mean for different
species under different circumstances
providing IACUCs with clear instructions on how to complete the Annual Facility
Reports
expanding the reporting system to include all species that the USDA has
legislative authority to regulate (mammals and birds), particularly laboratory-bred
mice and rats
closely monitoring research facilities' classification and reporting of animals

In addition to recommendations concerning the reporting system, The HSUS makes the
following recommendations related to alleviating pain and distress:
• Journals should adopt a policy of requiring manuscript authors to provide full
details on the use of pain- and distress-relieving drugs and other treatment
interventions
• The HSUS challenges peer-reviewed scientific journals to adopt a "no death as an
endpoint" policy in order to further progress the implementation of humane
endpoints into research
• Funding institutions should provide support for refinement research
• The NIH should issue "best practice" and "humane endpoint" guidelines to
facilitate the pace of innovation in laboratory animal welfare
XII. Summary and Conclusions
The public's support for animal use in biomedical research has declined in recent years.
The decrease in support is even more evident when the public is questioned about the
experimental use of animals involving pain and/or distress. In this instance, the level of
public support decreases significantly when harmful research is conducted on primates,
dogs and cats (Plous, 1998). With the public's interest in the humane treatment of animals
in laboratories and research, there should be greater attention provided to refining
techniques, to publicizing best practices, and to eliminating animal pain and distress. The
HSUS Initiative seeks to encourage methods of refinement and replacement, with the
goal to eliminate all animal pain and distress in research by the year 2020.
What does the research and speculation about animal pain, suffering and anxiety tell us
about animal well being? First, it is clear that we have to broaden our concerns about pain
to include a number of other states, such as anxiety and fear that are capable of producing
considerable suffering. Second, as suffering is conceived in the discussion in this paper, it
appears as though it may not be distributed as widely through the animal kingdom as our
vernacular use of the term might suggest. Damasio (1994), for example, argues that
suffering arose in creatures that possess sophisticated neurophysiology/neuroanatomy
capable of large-scale storage (memory) of a multitude of categories for objects and
events. These memory capabilities are then available for manipulation and creation of
novel solutions.
In the promotion of well being we have some responsibility not simply to minimize
animal pain, distress and suffering but also to enrich and enhance the existence of

animals that we use and keep for human benefit. This is what may lie behind efforts to
develop environmental enrichment programs for zoo and laboratory animals, and the
pressure to change minimum standards of animal care into optimal standards. However, if
our understanding of animal pain, distress and suffering is confused and incomplete, our
knowledge of what might constitute animal well-being is even more insubstantial.
The HSUS commends the USDA for initiating its own analysis of pain and distress
reporting, and developing a proposed set of solutions for reducing animal pain and
distress in a recent report (unpublished USDA Report: Use of Animals in Research: A
Study of Animal Welfare Act 1998 Annual Report Forms). The thorough nature of the
analysis and its concomitant recommendations will help further attention to animal pain
and distress issues, and hasten the progress of its alleviation.
In the past few years, fortunately, there has been an increase in attention to pain and
distress issues within science and academe. The result is steady progress in the form of
experimental data addressing animal distress and well being and an increase in the debate
about the conceptual issues. These activities will lead to improvements for both animals
and the humans that rely on them. In the end, better animal welfare will lead to better
science; unless the pain and distress, unwanted factors, are eliminated, they will always
confound scientific data and ultimately translate into poorer human welfare as well.
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XIV. Appendixes
APPENDIX I: USDA Policy 11 on Pain and Distress
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/polmanpdf.html
Policy #11 --- Painful/Distressful Procedures --- April 14, 1997
•
•
•
•

•

•

References: AWA Sections 13(a)(3), 13(a)(7), 13(e)(2, 3) and 9 CFR, Part 2,
Sections 2.31(d)(1)(i,ii,iii,iv), 2.31(e)(4), 2.33(b)(4) and 9 CFR, Part 3, Section
3.6(b)(5,6,7)
History: Replaces letters dated May 8, 1992, November 7, 1991, November 9,
1990, and March 1, 1990.
Justification: Provides requested guidance. Procedures involving animals will
avoid or minimize discomfort, distress and/or pain.
Policy: A painful procedure is defined as any procedure that would reasonably be
expected to cause more than slight or momentary pain and/or distress in a human
being to which that procedure is applied. The Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee (IACUC) is responsible for ensuring that investigators have
appropriately considered alternatives to any procedures that may cause more than
slight or momentary pain or distress. A written narrative description of the
methods and sources used to search for alternatives must be provided. Where
specific testing procedures are required by Federal law, the CFR references or
other legal guidelines requiring them should be noted.
Examples of procedures that can be expected to cause more than momentary or
slight pain include, but are not limited to, the following:
o Terminal Surgery is considered a painful procedure which is alleviated by
anesthesia.
o Freund's Complete Adjuvant used for antibody production may cause
results ranging from momentary or slight pain to severe pain depending on
the product, procedure, and species.
o Ocular and Skin Irritancy Testing. The dosing procedure itself is generally
not painful but the reaction caused by the product being tested may cause
pain.
Examples of procedures that may cause more than momentary or slight distress
include, but are not limited to, the following:
o Food or water deprivation beyond that necessary for normal presurgical
preparation.
o Noxious electrical shock that is not immediately escapable.
o Paralysis or immobility in a conscious animal.
o Many procedures, including any of those in the lists above, may cause
both pain and distress. An example of a procedure that can be expected to
cause more than momentary or slight pain as well as distress would be a
study involving extensive irradiation.
o Animals exhibiting signs of pain, discomfort, or distress such as decreased
appetite/activity level, adverse reactions to touching inoculated areas, open

sores/necrotic skin lesions, abscesses, lameness, conjunctivitis, corneal
edema, and photophobia are expected to receive appropriate relief unless
written scientific justification is provided in the animal activity proposal
and approved by the IACUC.
o Research facilities must have a mechanism in place for ensuring that
animals are reported in the appropriate pain category on the annual report
(APHIS Form 7023). Individual animals that do not experience
pain/distress from testing procedures should be reported in column C.
Individual animals experiencing pain/distress which is alleviated with
anesthetics, analgesics, sedatives and/or tranquilizers should be reported in
column D. This category includes terminal surgery under anesthesia.
Individual animals in which needed anesthetics, analgesics, sedatives,
and/or tranquilizers are withheld should be reported in column E. For all
column E animals, a written justification, approved by the IACUC, must
be provided, including CFR references or other guidelines if appropriate.

APPENDIX II. Top 50 NIH Funded Non-Profit Research Institutions Use of
Animals and Category E Reporting*

Table Summary in Graph Format

*Although The HSUS believes there is significant under-reporting of pain and distress
(especially distress) by US research institutions, we do not believe this under-reporting to
be planned or intentional. We believe the lack of adequate data is due to:
1. The inherent difficulties of assessing animal pain and animal distress
2. The lack of attention to addressing these issues by regulators and the research
community
3. The natural tendency to downplay the unpleasant consequences of actions taken
to produce substantial social benefits (e.g. knowledge, improved health care).

